Saudis throw down gauntlet to Israel, Iran
July 15, 2013: There was a time, not so long ago, when any missiles directed at Iran from Saudi Arabian soil would most likely have carried the insignia of the United States.
But that was before al-Qaeda's murderous campaign against American influence in the kingdom resulted in Washington relocating its military operations in the Gulf.
So we should not be surprised that the latest images of Saudi ballistic missiles directed at Iran and Israel bear the Saudis' distinctive green emblem of two swords beneath a palm tree. These days, rather than looking to Uncle Sam to protect their interests, the Saudis realise they are on their own.
As the Obama administration's inept handling of last week's removal of Egypt's first democratically elected government has demonstrated, not even a military coup in one of its most important regional allies will evoke much of a response from the White House.
With President Obama determined not to allow the US to be drawn into the region's poisonous disputes, whether Syria's brutal civil war or the controversy over Iran's nuclear program, former staunch American allies such as the Saudis have come to the reluctant conclusion that, so far as their own security is concerned, they must be more self-sufficient in protecting their interests.
This certainly explains the revelations by IHS Jane's Intelligence Review that recent satellite intelligence photographs show the Saudis have built a new missile base deep in the desert, stocked with powerful Chinese-made DF3 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1500 to 2000 miles, which are targeted at Israel and Iran.
That the Saudis find it necessary to point missiles at Israel is itself an indictment of the Obama administration's decision to turn its back on an ally. If America were fully engaged in taking care of its allies, then there would be no need for the Saudis to target Israel. As the recent WikiLeaks disclosures show, the Saudis share the same strategic objective as Israel: persuading the US to launch military action to destroy Iran's nuclear program - or, as one Saudi diplomat elegantly put it, to ''cut off the head of the snake''. But with the Obama administration absent, the Saudis believe they have no option but to defend themselves against potential Israeli aggression.
That missiles are also directed towards military targets in Iran should not come as a surprise. The Saudis are rightly concerned about the obsession Iran's ayatollahs have with arming themselves with nuclear weapons. Just having the capability to produce nuclear weapons would give Tehran a distinct advantage in its ambition to become the dominant regional power.
It is for this reason that, were the ayatollahs to press ahead with making nuclear weapons, the Saudis would respond immediately by buying an off-the-shelf device from Pakistan, whose nuclear arsenal has in the past received Saudi funding. The Middle East would then be plunged into a nuclear arms race.
With the Iranians engaged in a dangerous game of cat-and-mouse with the West over their nuclear intentions, the rivalry between the Gulf's two predominant powers is confined to a proxy and ugly war being fought between rival militias throughout the region.
In Iraq and Syria, Iran can be found backing murderous Shiite militias such as Hezbollah in its efforts to support, respectively, the governments of Shiite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad and the Assad regime in Damascus, Iran's closest regional ally.
The Saudis, on the other hand, are committed to supporting Sunni opposition groups in both countries although, unlike neighbouring Gulf states such as Qatar, their support falls well short of sponsoring al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups. One of Osama bin Laden's original objectives, after all, was to secure the overthrow of the Saudi royal family.
The main reason the Saudis feel obliged to involve themselves so deeply in Syria's conflict is that, without America's protection, they believe they must reshape the regional landscape in a way that better protects their interests.
This trend can be traced back directly to Mr Obama's decision to back the overthrow of Egypt's president Hosni Mubarak at the start of the Arab uprisings in 2011. Just like the Saudi royal family, Mubarak had been a staunch US ally for decades, and the administration's decision to abandon him sent as many shock waves through the royal palaces of Riyadh as it did through the souks of Cairo.
From that moment the Saudis concluded that Washington could no longer be trusted as a reliable ally, with the predictable result that the Saudis are embarked on a course of taking every possible action to protect themselves from the dangerous revolutionary currents sweeping the region.
The irony of Washington's decision to distance itself from Riyadh is that it comes when the Saudis are undergoing important changes. After years of the country being controlled by an ageing and deeply conservative elite, a new generation of dynamic and US-educated princes has emerged, determined to modernise the way the kingdom does business.
With the country's 89-year-old monarch King Abdullah in poor health, there is every possibility that a new generation of rulers will soon take power, with a mandate to tackle some of the country's more glaring anachronisms, such as the ban on women driving cars.
But for the moment the fate of the country rests with the old guard, and in their efforts to defend the kingdom from external threats they have taken an increasingly hard line against opponents.
That Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a close ally of Iran's ayatollahs has been sufficient to persuade the Saudis to give their whole-hearted backing to more moderate elements within the Syrian opposition.
Nor is there any reason to dismiss suggestions the Saudis were deeply involved in the military overthrow of Egypt's president Mohammed Mursi. Having opposed the removal of Mubarak in the first place, the Saudis had little interest in supporting his replacement by the Muslim Brotherhood.
The turning point was when Mursi launched Egypt on a course of rapprochement with Iran.
The prospect of Iran and Egypt striking up a strategic partnership that effectively encircled Saudi Arabia was too much. Rather than waiting for the US to wake up to the dire consequences of its disengagement policy in the Middle East, the new-look, assertive Saudis took matters into their own hands to make sure Mursi and his Islamist followers no longer posed a threat to their security and stability.
But that was before al-Qaeda's murderous campaign against American influence in the kingdom resulted in Washington relocating its military operations in the Gulf.
As the Obama administration's inept handling of last week's removal of Egypt's first democratically elected government has demonstrated, not even a military coup in one of its most important regional allies will evoke much of a response from the White House.
With President Obama determined not to allow the US to be drawn into the region's poisonous disputes, whether Syria's brutal civil war or the controversy over Iran's nuclear program, former staunch American allies such as the Saudis have come to the reluctant conclusion that, so far as their own security is concerned, they must be more self-sufficient in protecting their interests.
This certainly explains the revelations by IHS Jane's Intelligence Review that recent satellite intelligence photographs show the Saudis have built a new missile base deep in the desert, stocked with powerful Chinese-made DF3 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1500 to 2000 miles, which are targeted at Israel and Iran.
That the Saudis find it necessary to point missiles at Israel is itself an indictment of the Obama administration's decision to turn its back on an ally. If America were fully engaged in taking care of its allies, then there would be no need for the Saudis to target Israel. As the recent WikiLeaks disclosures show, the Saudis share the same strategic objective as Israel: persuading the US to launch military action to destroy Iran's nuclear program - or, as one Saudi diplomat elegantly put it, to ''cut off the head of the snake''. But with the Obama administration absent, the Saudis believe they have no option but to defend themselves against potential Israeli aggression.
That missiles are also directed towards military targets in Iran should not come as a surprise. The Saudis are rightly concerned about the obsession Iran's ayatollahs have with arming themselves with nuclear weapons. Just having the capability to produce nuclear weapons would give Tehran a distinct advantage in its ambition to become the dominant regional power.
It is for this reason that, were the ayatollahs to press ahead with making nuclear weapons, the Saudis would respond immediately by buying an off-the-shelf device from Pakistan, whose nuclear arsenal has in the past received Saudi funding. The Middle East would then be plunged into a nuclear arms race.
With the Iranians engaged in a dangerous game of cat-and-mouse with the West over their nuclear intentions, the rivalry between the Gulf's two predominant powers is confined to a proxy and ugly war being fought between rival militias throughout the region.
In Iraq and Syria, Iran can be found backing murderous Shiite militias such as Hezbollah in its efforts to support, respectively, the governments of Shiite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad and the Assad regime in Damascus, Iran's closest regional ally.
The Saudis, on the other hand, are committed to supporting Sunni opposition groups in both countries although, unlike neighbouring Gulf states such as Qatar, their support falls well short of sponsoring al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups. One of Osama bin Laden's original objectives, after all, was to secure the overthrow of the Saudi royal family.
The main reason the Saudis feel obliged to involve themselves so deeply in Syria's conflict is that, without America's protection, they believe they must reshape the regional landscape in a way that better protects their interests.
This trend can be traced back directly to Mr Obama's decision to back the overthrow of Egypt's president Hosni Mubarak at the start of the Arab uprisings in 2011. Just like the Saudi royal family, Mubarak had been a staunch US ally for decades, and the administration's decision to abandon him sent as many shock waves through the royal palaces of Riyadh as it did through the souks of Cairo.
From that moment the Saudis concluded that Washington could no longer be trusted as a reliable ally, with the predictable result that the Saudis are embarked on a course of taking every possible action to protect themselves from the dangerous revolutionary currents sweeping the region.
The irony of Washington's decision to distance itself from Riyadh is that it comes when the Saudis are undergoing important changes. After years of the country being controlled by an ageing and deeply conservative elite, a new generation of dynamic and US-educated princes has emerged, determined to modernise the way the kingdom does business.
With the country's 89-year-old monarch King Abdullah in poor health, there is every possibility that a new generation of rulers will soon take power, with a mandate to tackle some of the country's more glaring anachronisms, such as the ban on women driving cars.
But for the moment the fate of the country rests with the old guard, and in their efforts to defend the kingdom from external threats they have taken an increasingly hard line against opponents.
That Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a close ally of Iran's ayatollahs has been sufficient to persuade the Saudis to give their whole-hearted backing to more moderate elements within the Syrian opposition.
Nor is there any reason to dismiss suggestions the Saudis were deeply involved in the military overthrow of Egypt's president Mohammed Mursi. Having opposed the removal of Mubarak in the first place, the Saudis had little interest in supporting his replacement by the Muslim Brotherhood.
The turning point was when Mursi launched Egypt on a course of rapprochement with Iran.
The prospect of Iran and Egypt striking up a strategic partnership that effectively encircled Saudi Arabia was too much. Rather than waiting for the US to wake up to the dire consequences of its disengagement policy in the Middle East, the new-look, assertive Saudis took matters into their own hands to make sure Mursi and his Islamist followers no longer posed a threat to their security and stability.
Courtesy: The Canberra Times